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1. INTRODUCTION
The completion of the Global Tailings Review (GTR) 
represents the commencement of another phase of 
the process. The GTR has produced a Global Industry 
Standard on Tailings Management (‘the Standard’); 
a Consultation Report, providing an overview of the 
public consultation process and a summary of the 
feedback received; and finally, a set of GTR Papers, 
canvassing a broad set of considerations about the 
public safety and integrity of tailings facilities. 
The next challenge will be to build on the work of 
the GTR and ensure that the Standard delivers on 
its promise. The ultimate measure of success will 
be evidence that the Standard has contributed to a 
significant and sustained reduction in the number 
and severity of catastrophic tailings facility failures. 
For this goal to be achieved, the Standard needs to be 
widely adopted within the mining industry, and used 
to drive improved tailings management practices at 
the operational level. Given the level of public concern 
about the will and the capacity of the mining industry 
to ensure the safety of tailings facilities, another 
important goal must be to ensure that the Standard 
has credibility in the eyes of governments, affected 
communities, and wider society.
This Paper has been prepared to inform the three 
co-conveners – the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP), the International Council of 
Mining and Metals (ICMM), and the Principles for 
Responsible Investment (PRI) – about possible 
options for implementing the Standard and to put 
forward one preferred option for consideration.1 
1. This was flagged as a topic of interest by the co-conveners at the time 
the GTR was launched.  According to the  ‘Scope of Work’ summary on 
the GTR website:  ‘[T]he Chair is empowered to independently propose 
recommendations both on best practices in the management of tailings 
and on a proposal for establishing an independent body to manage 
implementation of the Standard’  (https://globaltailingsreview.org/about/
scope/).
It draws on the direct experience of the authors 
in implementing other voluntary schemes and 
in conducting research about their uptake and 
effectiveness.
2. OPTIONS
There are at least five different pathways that can 
support the roll-out the Standard and promote its 
uptake.
1. Global guidance: The Standard is released and 
promoted as a normative set of expectations to 
be implemented by interested companies, and 
for use by any stakeholder group that wishes 
to hold companies to account against a global 
Standard. A standardised assessment and/or 
reporting process is not available; rather, it is left 
to individual organisations to determine how they 
wish to use the Standard. An example of this 
approach would be the UNEP’s well-established 
Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies at 
Local Level (APELL) programme.
2. Industry self-regulation: Industry organisations 
such as the ICMM agree to formally adopt 
the Standard and make it a requirement that 
member companies agree to follow the Standard. 
Companies commit to test conformance either 
via self-assessment, or by hiring external auditors/
assessors of their choice. This process is internal 
and controlled and managed by the company or 
an industry body. Assessment reports may or 
may not be released publicly, depending on what 
the industry body requires. An example of this 
approach would be the Mining Association of 
Canada’s Towards Sustainable Mining scheme.
3. State-based regulation: States undertake to 
require or promote implementation through 
legislation, regulations, guidelines or other 
* Member of the Expert Panel
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Arguably, states will be more likely to pick up the 
Standard once its credibility has been established via 
an independent entity. This will also be the case for 
third party actors such as banks and insurers, who are 
looking for certification processes that they can have 
confidence in (Option 4). These other actors have a 
valuable role to play in promoting industry uptake of 
the Standard, but they are unlikely to be able to lead 
the implementation process.
The following sections of this Paper outline a potential 
pathway towards establishing the independent entity. 
It also discusses implementation challenges that will 
need to be addressed, including how the entity would 
be resourced, how to secure industry participation in 
such a scheme, and the relationship between – and 
interface with – other voluntary schemes.
3. THE INDEPENDENT ENTITY OPTION
3.1 ROLES AND FUNCTIONS
Core function
The primary purpose of an independent entity would 
be to manage an assurance framework for facilities 
to be audited against the Standard, with certification 
conducted by qualified, independent third-party 
assessors (see the section on ‘certification’ below). 
This purpose would need to be reflected in an 
organisational charter, along with other aspects of the 
organisation’s remit.
Other activities
There are a range of other activities that an 
independent entity could perform, although in general, 
the more the organisation expands outside its core 
function, the less focussed it is likely to be. Some 
of the roles listed below could be considered after a 
reasonable level of financial stability and participation 
had been achieved. Initially, however, the focus should 
be on the core mission of setting up and ensuring a 
credible and sustainable certification process.
regulatory mechanisms (approval or permitting 
conditions) and hold enforcement power. Each 
jurisdiction determines which requirements in 
the Standard will apply and how they will be 
monitored. An example of this would be the 
development of National Action Plans by states 
as an instrument to implement the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights.2 
4. Third-party regulation: Other economic actors 
such as banks, insurers and investment funds 
make compliance with the Standard a condition 
for investing in a company, approving loans for 
projects, providing insurance for tailings facilities, 
and so on. The basis on which the third-party 
makes this assessment, and whether this is 
publicly disclosed, is a matter for the third- party. 
An example of this approach would be the way in 
which the finance sector uses the International 
Finance Corporation’s Environmental and Social 
Performance Standards in the application of the 
Equator Principles.
5. Independent entity: An independent entity 
is established to host the Standard, test 
conformance, and report assessment outcomes 
in the public domain. A certificate of conformance 
is issued through a process governed by an 
independent entity, which is not controlled or 
managed by any single stakeholder group. An 
example of such an entity is the International 
Cyanide Management Institute, which manages 
the International Cyanide Management Code.
Clearly, these pathways are not mutually exclusive. 
It is possible, for example, to conceive of hybrid 
models that incorporate elements of two or more 
approaches (e.g. an industry organisation makes it a 
condition of membership that a company commits 
to having its operations certified and reported on by 
an independent entity). Looking further ahead, it is 
also possible to envisage a multi-layered system of 
governance in which several approaches - perhaps 
even all - are utilised to some extent (e.g. some 
companies opt to self-assess, some participate in 
industry-managed processes, and others submit to an 
external certification process, all within a framework 
where both governments and third parties impose 
their own requirements). 
Although there are multiple possibilities, our 
assessment is that Option 5 – the establishment of 
an independent entity – should be a point of focus 
for the co-conveners. This would entail establishing 
a ‘home’ for the Standard in an organisation with a 
2. See https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/UNWG_
NAPGuidance.pdf
multi-stakeholder governing body that considers the 
priorities of relevant constituencies. The key functions 
of this entity would be to design, manage and 
promote a credible certification process. This could 
include:
a. developing and quality assuring an audit protocol
b. approving or accrediting assessors
c. developing guidance materials for operators 
seeking certification
d. testing and tracking conformance over time
e. regular public reporting on the work of the entity 
against agreed indicators 
f. updating the Standard where required (e.g. 
as technology or best practices evolve, or as 
implementation shows deficiencies in the 
Standard)
g. engaging with third parties, including 
governments, communities, insurers and 
investors, to promote understanding of, and build 
confidence in, the Standard.
In our view, the independent entity has several 
advantages over other models. 
First, creating a standing body will provide a 
mechanism for institutionalising the Standard and 
will maintain the momentum for change. By contrast, 
simply releasing the Standard and leaving it to other 
parties to decide when and how to take it forward 
(Option 1) presents a risk of dilution and uneven take-
up. 
Second, such an entity would provide the Standard 
with a certain autonomy from industry, reduce the risk 
(real or perceived) of industry capture and build trust 
and credibility with external stakeholders. It would 
certainly score higher on transparency criteria. This 
is a significant advantage over an industry-operated 
scheme (Option 2) or one that leaves it to individual 
companies to self-assess against the Standard 
(Option 1). 
Third, such a body could provide a neutral space in 
which industry and third parties could share views 
about the operation and effectiveness of the Standard, 
and focus on the common goal of preventing future 
catastrophic tailings facility failures. 
Incorporating the Standard into a state-based 
regulatory framework (Option 3) would be a good 
long-term outcome and should be encouraged, but 
this is unlikely to happen quickly, or in a uniform way. 
One activity that should be regarded as core is to 
provide or arrange training to promote awareness of 
and understanding of the Standard. It will be essential 
that the entity itself hosts this training to ensure that 
there is consistency in messaging the Standard’s 
expectations and interpretation of its audit protocols 
and guidance documents. Training should be open 
not just to the industry but also to other stakeholders, 
such as states and other interested parties. The 
independent entity could also, for instance, facilitate 
a programme of public education about mine tailings 
and storage facilities. 
Other activities which could be considered include:
• advocacy on issues pertaining to management of 
tailing facilities
• hosting roundtables of experts and key 
stakeholders on issues of concern
• participation in (or driving) global initiatives
• encouraging innovation 
• sharing best practice technologies and approaches 
for tailings facilities
• presenting at international forums (e.g. the 
Intergovernmental Forum) 
• engaging investors/financers and governments to 
encourage uptake.
In the longer term, the independent entity may also be 
in a position to identify and recommend research in 
priority topic areas. If the financial model provides for 
a surplus, the entity could itself commission research 
that the industry or individual companies may not 
be in a position to support, and that the independent 
entity or its Board or advisers agree is a priority. 
3.2  ORGANISATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND 
STRUCTURE
Organisational capability
The independent entity would need the internal 
capability to support its core activities with room for 
growth. Expertise in different functional areas would 
be necessary for the entity to fully support core 
activities. These would likely include the following 
domains.
• Technical: Technical expertise will be essential, 
comprised of professionals with deep knowledge 
of tailings management and dam design, and other 
disciplines as well. This technical expertise whether 
Certification – the provision by an independent 
body of written assurance (a certificate) that the 
product, service or system in question meets 
specific requirements.
Source: International Organisation for Standards 
(ISO): https://www.iso.org/certification.html 
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preparation of administering the standard and 
certification process. Preliminary calculations indicate 
that the initial work of scoping, designing, and 
standing up an independent body, with appropriate 
governance arrangements, can be accomplished 
for a modest sum. The larger expenses will be the 
staffing, engagement of consultants, establishment 
of administrative procedures and systems, and 
the development of the necessary programme 
documents, including but not limited to, audit 
protocols, guidance documents for auditors and 
participants, and a dispute mechanism. Additional 
work would involve the development of a website, 
outreach materials, field trials of assessment 
documents, and the recruitment and vetting of 
assessors to perform the envisioned certification 
work. The work described above, we believe, can 
be accomplished within a two-year period for 
approximately USD 3.3 million.3 
There are several funding models available to support 
a new independent entity. One option would be to 
approach a Foundation, or similar body, for a large, 
multi-year grant to provide the seed capital necessary 
to establish and sustain the organisation in the early 
stages. Such grants, however, are difficult to secure, 
particularly where funders may see this as something 
that the mining industry should bear responsibility for. 
Alternatively, one or two of the co-conveners could 
consider providing the funding for the first year(s) of 
operation. 
Another option is for industry to bear a significant 
proportion of the costs of establishing and 
maintaining the new entity. One way of doing this 
would be through a membership model, where 
companies pay an annual fee to belong to the entity 
and support its activities. Other sectors that are likely 
to utilise the Standard (for example insurers and 
investment funds) could also be invited to become 
members.
Given the controversy around tailings facility 
management practices, an industry-only membership 
model would be likely to raise concerns amongst 
stakeholders about the independence of the entity. 
It may be possible to overcome this, but it would 
require extensive thought and consideration to be 
given to governance processes. For example, the 
independence of the governing board would have 
to be guaranteed, the board would need to include 
several non-industry members, and the appointment 
3. In estimating costs we assume that initial staffing will be small, with 
support from contractors, and augmented through secondees. After the first 
year, staffing increase as work commences and revenue becomes apparent. 
Over time, costs will be gradually covered through revenue and earnings.
internal or contracted will support the development 
of the assurance procedures, protocols and criteria 
for implementation. As participating companies 
move to certify facilities, technical expertise 
may also be needed to provide guidance and 
interpretation of Standard on matters as they arise. 
• Communications: The communications arm 
would focus on establishing the brand, publicising 
the organisation and the scheme, promoting the 
benefits of certification, and profiling facilities that 
achieve certification. This function could either be 
outsourced, in whole or in part, or established as an 
in-house, dedicated resource. 
• Administrative: Programme administration would 
likely include managerial, administrative and 
accounting functions. Additionally, this arm of the 
organisation would monitor and report to other 
parts of the organisation on interest in the scheme 
and uptake of certification.
• Executive: This arm would include a President 
(or Chairperson), a governing Board of Trustees 
or Directors, and a Chief Executive Officer who is 
answerable to the Board (see below). 
Governance arrangements
As with other organisations, it would be the role of 
the executive arm to provide strategic direction. 
It is envisaged that the board would comprise 
representatives from across the stakeholder spectrum 
to provide different constituencies with a voice in 
decision making, but with a ‘super majority’ having a 
working knowledge of mining and tailings facilities. 
The board may wish to appoint advisory groups to 
provide advice on specialist matters as they arise.
This proposed configuration bears some similarity 
to the arrangements for managing the International 
Cyanide Management Code; where it differs is that it 
also includes a multi-stakeholder Board of Directors. 
The Mining Association of Canada has appointed a 
multi-stakeholder Advisory Group to provide advice 
on community-related issues but does not include 
non-industry representation on its Board. What is 
envisaged here is the inclusion of non-industry, multi-
stakeholder perspectives within the core governance 
structure. The benefit of this approach is that it builds 
relationships of trust amongst different stakeholder 
groups, and addresses stakeholder concerns about 
the potential of the independent entity to be ‘captured’ 
by industry interests.
3.3  RESOURCING AND FUNDING MODEL
Experience has shown that the development of 
assurance schemes can be both lengthy and resource 
intensive. Nonetheless, the establishment of an 
independent managing entity could occur within a 
6-12 month period. It will be important to the ultimate 
success of the scheme that commitment and support 
by the co-conveners and stakeholders be maintained 
in the establishment phase, and then throughout the 
development of the entire scheme and, which may 
take up to two years. 
Seed capital will be needed to establish the 
independent entity and fund its initial work in 
of CEO would need to be endorsed by both non-
industry and industry members. 
A further possibility is for the entity to rely primarily (or 
partly) on income earned through the charging of fees 
for participating companies, based on a formula that 
considers the number of facilities to be included in the 
programme. In this model, companies are effectively 
customers, rather than members. The entity would 
still need to be attuned to the interests and concerns 
of companies, given that their participation is 
voluntary, but the entity would not be subject to their 
control.
3.4   THE ASSESSMENT FUNCTION
Selection of assessors 
To fulfil its core purpose, the entity would need 
to accredit a cadre of qualified and experienced 
assessors to assess facilities against the Standard. 
Our assumption is that these assessors would be self-
employed consultants or employed by a professional 
services firm, rather than being employees of 
the independent entity. Companies applying for 
certification would contract accredited individuals or 
firms to assess conformance against the Standard.
Criteria for assessors will need to be established. 
Rather than the new entity accrediting assessors, 
it may rely on professional accreditation by other 
bodies. The entity could set minimum qualifications 
and note that accreditation by certain bodies would be 
acceptable. 
The issue of auditor or certification liability will 
require consideration. It will also be imperative to 
have a process for managing conflicts of interest, 
particularly given that there are likely to be only a 
limited number of available professionals who could 
competently assess conformance with the Standard. 
In time, market forces may help to expand the pool, 
though this may depend on the criteria developed for 
accrediting assessors and the level of participation by 
companies. 
Given the broad scope of the Standard’s requirements, 
audits will likely need to be conducted by teams of 
assessors from different disciplinary backgrounds. 
Having non-engineers review, evaluate, and pass 
judgement on the sufficiency of engineering design 
criteria or construction documents, or management 
practices, will not be acceptable. Likewise, an 
Start-up cost estimates over two years  
(USD 3.3 million):
• Working group support (travel, secretariat) – 
175,000
• Legal services (document review, trademark, 
anti-trust compliance, bylaws, dispute 
resolution, registration and incorporation of 
entity) – 300,000
• Technical consultants (drafting audit protocols, 
guidance documents, internal procedure and 
process documents, field testing) – 420,000
• Outreach and communications (website, 
promotional materials, webinars, meetings/
conferences) – 315,000 
• Training seminars (travel, facilities, materials) 
– 220,000
• Translation services (10 documents in six 
languages) – 280,000
• Staffing (including benefits for one-year) – 
1,080,000
• Rental , furnishings, utilities (one-year) – 
200,000
• Director and officers liability insurance (one-
year) – 65,000
• Audit by external accounting firm (one-year) 
–15,000
• Board support (travel and accommodations for 
one-year) – 230,000
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preparation of administering the standard and 
certification process. Preliminary calculations indicate 
that the initial work of scoping, designing, and 
standing up an independent body, with appropriate 
governance arrangements, can be accomplished 
for a modest sum. The larger expenses will be the 
staffing, engagement of consultants, establishment 
of administrative procedures and systems, and 
the development of the necessary programme 
documents, including but not limited to, audit 
protocols, guidance documents for auditors and 
participants, and a dispute mechanism. Additional 
work would involve the development of a website, 
outreach materials, field trials of assessment 
documents, and the recruitment and vetting of 
assessors to perform the envisioned certification 
work. The work described above, we believe, can 
be accomplished within a two-year period for 
approximately USD 3.3 million.3 
There are several funding models available to support 
a new independent entity. One option would be to 
approach a Foundation, or similar body, for a large, 
multi-year grant to provide the seed capital necessary 
to establish and sustain the organisation in the early 
stages. Such grants, however, are difficult to secure, 
particularly where funders may see this as something 
that the mining industry should bear responsibility for. 
Alternatively, one or two of the co-conveners could 
consider providing the funding for the first year(s) of 
operation. 
Another option is for industry to bear a significant 
proportion of the costs of establishing and 
maintaining the new entity. One way of doing this 
would be through a membership model, where 
companies pay an annual fee to belong to the entity 
and support its activities. Other sectors that are likely 
to utilise the Standard (for example insurers and 
investment funds) could also be invited to become 
members.
Given the controversy around tailings facility 
management practices, an industry-only membership 
model would be likely to raise concerns amongst 
stakeholders about the independence of the entity. 
It may be possible to overcome this, but it would 
require extensive thought and consideration to be 
given to governance processes. For example, the 
independence of the governing board would have 
to be guaranteed, the board would need to include 
several non-industry members, and the appointment 
3. In estimating costs we assume that initial staffing will be small, with 
support from contractors, and augmented through secondees. After the first 
year, staffing increase as work commences and revenue becomes apparent. 
Over time, costs will be gradually covered through revenue and earnings.
internal or contracted will support the development 
of the assurance procedures, protocols and criteria 
for implementation. As participating companies 
move to certify facilities, technical expertise 
may also be needed to provide guidance and 
interpretation of Standard on matters as they arise. 
• Communications: The communications arm 
would focus on establishing the brand, publicising 
the organisation and the scheme, promoting the 
benefits of certification, and profiling facilities that 
achieve certification. This function could either be 
outsourced, in whole or in part, or established as an 
in-house, dedicated resource. 
• Administrative: Programme administration would 
likely include managerial, administrative and 
accounting functions. Additionally, this arm of the 
organisation would monitor and report to other 
parts of the organisation on interest in the scheme 
and uptake of certification.
• Executive: This arm would include a President 
(or Chairperson), a governing Board of Trustees 
or Directors, and a Chief Executive Officer who is 
answerable to the Board (see below). 
Governance arrangements
As with other organisations, it would be the role of 
the executive arm to provide strategic direction. 
It is envisaged that the board would comprise 
representatives from across the stakeholder spectrum 
to provide different constituencies with a voice in 
decision making, but with a ‘super majority’ having a 
working knowledge of mining and tailings facilities. 
The board may wish to appoint advisory groups to 
provide advice on specialist matters as they arise.
This proposed configuration bears some similarity 
to the arrangements for managing the International 
Cyanide Management Code; where it differs is that it 
also includes a multi-stakeholder Board of Directors. 
The Mining Association of Canada has appointed a 
multi-stakeholder Advisory Group to provide advice 
on community-related issues but does not include 
non-industry representation on its Board. What is 
envisaged here is the inclusion of non-industry, multi-
stakeholder perspectives within the core governance 
structure. The benefit of this approach is that it builds 
relationships of trust amongst different stakeholder 
groups, and addresses stakeholder concerns about 
the potential of the independent entity to be ‘captured’ 
by industry interests.
3.3  RESOURCING AND FUNDING MODEL
Experience has shown that the development of 
assurance schemes can be both lengthy and resource 
intensive. Nonetheless, the establishment of an 
independent managing entity could occur within a 
6-12 month period. It will be important to the ultimate 
success of the scheme that commitment and support 
by the co-conveners and stakeholders be maintained 
in the establishment phase, and then throughout the 
development of the entire scheme and, which may 
take up to two years. 
Seed capital will be needed to establish the 
independent entity and fund its initial work in 
of CEO would need to be endorsed by both non-
industry and industry members. 
A further possibility is for the entity to rely primarily (or 
partly) on income earned through the charging of fees 
for participating companies, based on a formula that 
considers the number of facilities to be included in the 
programme. In this model, companies are effectively 
customers, rather than members. The entity would 
still need to be attuned to the interests and concerns 
of companies, given that their participation is 
voluntary, but the entity would not be subject to their 
control.
3.4   THE ASSESSMENT FUNCTION
Selection of assessors 
To fulfil its core purpose, the entity would need 
to accredit a cadre of qualified and experienced 
assessors to assess facilities against the Standard. 
Our assumption is that these assessors would be self-
employed consultants or employed by a professional 
services firm, rather than being employees of 
the independent entity. Companies applying for 
certification would contract accredited individuals or 
firms to assess conformance against the Standard.
Criteria for assessors will need to be established. 
Rather than the new entity accrediting assessors, 
it may rely on professional accreditation by other 
bodies. The entity could set minimum qualifications 
and note that accreditation by certain bodies would be 
acceptable. 
The issue of auditor or certification liability will 
require consideration. It will also be imperative to 
have a process for managing conflicts of interest, 
particularly given that there are likely to be only a 
limited number of available professionals who could 
competently assess conformance with the Standard. 
In time, market forces may help to expand the pool, 
though this may depend on the criteria developed for 
accrediting assessors and the level of participation by 
companies. 
Given the broad scope of the Standard’s requirements, 
audits will likely need to be conducted by teams of 
assessors from different disciplinary backgrounds. 
Having non-engineers review, evaluate, and pass 
judgement on the sufficiency of engineering design 
criteria or construction documents, or management 
practices, will not be acceptable. Likewise, an 
Start-up cost estimates over two years  
(USD 3.3 million):
• Working group support (travel, secretariat) – 
175,000
• Legal services (document review, trademark, 
anti-trust compliance, bylaws, dispute 
resolution, registration and incorporation of 
entity) – 300,000
• Technical consultants (drafting audit protocols, 
guidance documents, internal procedure and 
process documents, field testing) – 420,000
• Outreach and communications (website, 
promotional materials, webinars, meetings/
conferences) – 315,000 
• Training seminars (travel, facilities, materials) 
– 220,000
• Translation services (10 documents in six 
languages) – 280,000
• Staffing (including benefits for one-year) – 
1,080,000
• Rental , furnishings, utilities (one-year) – 
200,000
• Director and officers liability insurance (one-
year) – 65,000
• Audit by external accounting firm (one-year) 
–15,000
• Board support (travel and accommodations for 
one-year) – 230,000
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Communicating the outcome 
Communicating the outcome of certification would 
need to be formalised under the schemes’ audit 
procedures and protocols. It is envisaged that an 
operator would be notified of the outcome first, with 
agreed protocols for the public communication of a 
successful outcome, alongside an announcement by 
the independent entity. 
The level of public disclosure and transparency 
across all elements of the programme would need 
to be carefully considered by the organisation’s 
executive and governing board. If the focus is safety, 
in particular public safety, then not disclosing failed 
assessments and informing potentially affected 
people of the failures and the reason for the failure 
seems contrary to the purpose of the programme. 
Similarly, whether pre- or post-certification conditions 
or opportunities for improvement over and above the 
minimum requirement would be disclosed is another 
matter to be clarified. Given the Standard’s emphasis 
on transparency and public disclosure, it is envisaged 
that any conditions for certification would be publicly 
disclosed. If an operator is not comfortable with this 
level of disclosure, they would have to close out any 
gaps prior to certification. 
The International Cyanide Management Code posts 
on its website summary audit reports for each 
certified operation in its programme. This allows 
stakeholders to read for themselves what the auditors 
found during their inspection. This high level of 
transparency sets the programme apart from other 
certification schemes. Furthermore, the auditors’ 
credentials are posted along with summary audit 
reports so that the public can see who audited the 
operation, and their experience and qualifications.
Finally, assessment and audit reports are an 
important source of data for understanding the overall 
impact and effectiveness of a scheme, and where 
industry practice sits across assessed facilities. 
The entity would therefore need to monitor, evaluate 
and report on the uptake and impact of certification 
on a regular basis. The entity would also serve as a 
repository of data from the assessments, providing a 
source of evidence about industry changes in global 
tailings management, over time. The International 
Cyanide Management Institute also reports annually 
on findings, assessment trends and so forth. The 
disclosure of information would contribute to the 
stock of publicly available knowledge about tailings 
facilities globally. 
assessment that only involved engineers, and 
focused solely on the facility, would be contrary to 
the scope and intent of the Standard. It may not be 
necessary, however, to include community specialists 
in all instances, for example, where a facility has no 
proximate population or downstream community. 
Assessment teams could be calibrated to match the 
profile of a facility. In all cases a lead assessor will 
need to be appointed, and qualifications for that role 
would have to be defined.
Assessment process 
Once the question of the composition and 
qualifications of assessment teams is resolved, it is 
likely that the mechanics of the certification would be 
much the same as with other voluntary schemes. 
The process would commence with assessors 
examining documentation, conducting interviews 
with corporate and site-based personnel and local 
stakeholders, and visiting the facility and nearby and 
downstream communities as appropriate. Having 
considered the evidence, assessors would submit a 
report to the independent entity indicating whether 
certification is warranted, and, if not, the corrective 
actions needed to achieve certification. 
The role of the independent entity would be to 
determine whether the assessors made clear 
findings to warrant certification and specify whether 
conditions are to be applied before certification is 
granted (such as a corrective action plan). Any follow-
up process, including specified actions and deadlines 
for implementation, would involve assessors in 
agreeing to the corrective action plan. This entire 
process would need to be outlined in a series of audit 
procedures and protocols.
3.5   THE CERTIFICATION FUNCTION
Unit of certification
Certification schemes vary in terms of their ‘unit’ of 
certification. The Standard was written with the intent 
of certifying individual facilities – not operations or 
companies. While the wording of the Standard was 
drafted this way, it is the case that some operations 
will have multiple storage facilities, while others will be 
located some distance from a mine. 
The new entity would need to establish greater 
precision as to the unit of certification in a wide variety 
of operational circumstances. It may be prudent, for 
instance, to certify two adjacent facilities in the one 
assessment, particularly if they are governed by a 
common operator, management framework, or set of 
systems. 
Likewise, the entity would need to define the 
process for follow-on certification where the unit of 
certification was a new facility (i.e. a facility in the 
pre-construction phase), given that many elements of 
the Standard would have been assessed in the initial 
assessment (e.g. alternatives analysis, consequence 
classification, and design criteria). The draft Standard 
has provided an indication of which requirements 
would apply to new and existing facilities, but this will 
need further refinement from a ‘unit of certification’ 
perspective.
Mechanics of certification
The purpose of an independent entity would be to 
provide assurance that the unit of certification (i.e. the 
facility) conforms to the requirements of the Standard. 
A simple model of assurance would conclude that 
a facility was either ‘compliant’ or ‘non-compliant’ 
with the Standard and would answer the question in 
a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ format. It is rare, however, that industry 
certification schemes that are geared towards 
performance improvement proceed on this basis. 
Instead, most industry certification schemes have a 
graduated model to encourage initial uptake, and to 
encourage continual improvement over time. 
To balance the need for a high bar and to encourage 
uptake, some schemes nominate a ‘core’ set of 
criteria judged by compliance/non-compliance and a 
threshold of performance with room for improvement 
for all other requirements. Some schemes have, in 
addition to this, a graduated level of achievement, 
such as the Mining Association of Canada’s Towards 
Sustainable Mining scheme that allows for recognition 
at upper and lower ends of the performance curve. 
A graduated process is envisaged for the Global 
Industry Standard on Tailings Management, with 
a period for operators to address non-core gaps 
either before certification is granted or as part of a 
conditional certification. 
In terms of encouraging certification, the entity 
could consider establishing an online platform for 
private self-assessment, as a ‘confidence-builder’ 
for operators interested in certification. The Mining 
Association of Canada’s Towards Sustainable 
Mining scheme and the Aluminium Stewardship 
Initiative offer self-assessment tools for companies 
interested in testing their level of conformance before 
commencing the formal certification process.
Period of certification
At this stage, it is envisaged that certification would 
stand for a defined period, after which a follow-up 
assessment would be required. A shorter certification 
period for facilities that hold the potential for loss of 
life might be considered appropriate, with a longer 
period for facilities that have no potential for loss 
of life. This would reflect the goal of zero tolerance 
for human fatality and avoid low consequence 
facilities having to be subject to burdensome 
certification renewal processes. Likewise, the period 
of certification should also consider changes in a 
facility. For example, a tailings facility that has had 
multiple lifts or a facility that is approaching capacity 
may warrant a shorter recertification period. Change 
in ownership might also be a consideration, as these 
may substantially change resources and management 
focus.
A possible way forward is to require re-certification 
every f three years for higher consequence facilities 
(i.e. ‘Extreme’, ‘Very High’ or ‘High’), and at five 
year intervals for lower consequence facilities (i.e. 
‘Significant’ and ‘Low’), but this would need further 
discussion.. Given a shortage of experienced 
professionals available to assess against the 
Standard, differentiated time periods for certification 
could be a practical approach. Likewise, it may be 
prudent to calibrate a renewal process based on risk.
3.6  NON-COMPLIANCE AND CORRECTIVE 
ACTION
Addressing issues of non-conformance while under 
certification would be important for upholding the 
credibility of the scheme, while at the same time 
encouraging industry uptake. Most existing schemes 
are able to withdraw certification to sanction 
an identified or reported non-conformance. The 
Responsible Jewellery Council, for instance, applies a 
‘suspension’ procedure and a five-stage re-certification 
process. Other schemes can trigger a corrective 
action procedure that does not involve suspension, 
but rather, provides a defined period for the operator 
to correct the non-conformance before moving to 
suspension. 
Most certification schemes have a complaints 
mechanism for stakeholders to lodge complaints 
or issues. The Responsible Jewellery Council, for 
example, has a formal mechanism that aims to 
resolve complaints related to non-conformance 
with certification and accreditation of members. 
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Communicating the outcome 
Communicating the outcome of certification would 
need to be formalised under the schemes’ audit 
procedures and protocols. It is envisaged that an 
operator would be notified of the outcome first, with 
agreed protocols for the public communication of a 
successful outcome, alongside an announcement by 
the independent entity. 
The level of public disclosure and transparency 
across all elements of the programme would need 
to be carefully considered by the organisation’s 
executive and governing board. If the focus is safety, 
in particular public safety, then not disclosing failed 
assessments and informing potentially affected 
people of the failures and the reason for the failure 
seems contrary to the purpose of the programme. 
Similarly, whether pre- or post-certification conditions 
or opportunities for improvement over and above the 
minimum requirement would be disclosed is another 
matter to be clarified. Given the Standard’s emphasis 
on transparency and public disclosure, it is envisaged 
that any conditions for certification would be publicly 
disclosed. If an operator is not comfortable with this 
level of disclosure, they would have to close out any 
gaps prior to certification. 
The International Cyanide Management Code posts 
on its website summary audit reports for each 
certified operation in its programme. This allows 
stakeholders to read for themselves what the auditors 
found during their inspection. This high level of 
transparency sets the programme apart from other 
certification schemes. Furthermore, the auditors’ 
credentials are posted along with summary audit 
reports so that the public can see who audited the 
operation, and their experience and qualifications.
Finally, assessment and audit reports are an 
important source of data for understanding the overall 
impact and effectiveness of a scheme, and where 
industry practice sits across assessed facilities. 
The entity would therefore need to monitor, evaluate 
and report on the uptake and impact of certification 
on a regular basis. The entity would also serve as a 
repository of data from the assessments, providing a 
source of evidence about industry changes in global 
tailings management, over time. The International 
Cyanide Management Institute also reports annually 
on findings, assessment trends and so forth. The 
disclosure of information would contribute to the 
stock of publicly available knowledge about tailings 
facilities globally. 
assessment that only involved engineers, and 
focused solely on the facility, would be contrary to 
the scope and intent of the Standard. It may not be 
necessary, however, to include community specialists 
in all instances, for example, where a facility has no 
proximate population or downstream community. 
Assessment teams could be calibrated to match the 
profile of a facility. In all cases a lead assessor will 
need to be appointed, and qualifications for that role 
would have to be defined.
Assessment process 
Once the question of the composition and 
qualifications of assessment teams is resolved, it is 
likely that the mechanics of the certification would be 
much the same as with other voluntary schemes. 
The process would commence with assessors 
examining documentation, conducting interviews 
with corporate and site-based personnel and local 
stakeholders, and visiting the facility and nearby and 
downstream communities as appropriate. Having 
considered the evidence, assessors would submit a 
report to the independent entity indicating whether 
certification is warranted, and, if not, the corrective 
actions needed to achieve certification. 
The role of the independent entity would be to 
determine whether the assessors made clear 
findings to warrant certification and specify whether 
conditions are to be applied before certification is 
granted (such as a corrective action plan). Any follow-
up process, including specified actions and deadlines 
for implementation, would involve assessors in 
agreeing to the corrective action plan. This entire 
process would need to be outlined in a series of audit 
procedures and protocols.
3.5   THE CERTIFICATION FUNCTION
Unit of certification
Certification schemes vary in terms of their ‘unit’ of 
certification. The Standard was written with the intent 
of certifying individual facilities – not operations or 
companies. While the wording of the Standard was 
drafted this way, it is the case that some operations 
will have multiple storage facilities, while others will be 
located some distance from a mine. 
The new entity would need to establish greater 
precision as to the unit of certification in a wide variety 
of operational circumstances. It may be prudent, for 
instance, to certify two adjacent facilities in the one 
assessment, particularly if they are governed by a 
common operator, management framework, or set of 
systems. 
Likewise, the entity would need to define the 
process for follow-on certification where the unit of 
certification was a new facility (i.e. a facility in the 
pre-construction phase), given that many elements of 
the Standard would have been assessed in the initial 
assessment (e.g. alternatives analysis, consequence 
classification, and design criteria). The draft Standard 
has provided an indication of which requirements 
would apply to new and existing facilities, but this will 
need further refinement from a ‘unit of certification’ 
perspective.
Mechanics of certification
The purpose of an independent entity would be to 
provide assurance that the unit of certification (i.e. the 
facility) conforms to the requirements of the Standard. 
A simple model of assurance would conclude that 
a facility was either ‘compliant’ or ‘non-compliant’ 
with the Standard and would answer the question in 
a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ format. It is rare, however, that industry 
certification schemes that are geared towards 
performance improvement proceed on this basis. 
Instead, most industry certification schemes have a 
graduated model to encourage initial uptake, and to 
encourage continual improvement over time. 
To balance the need for a high bar and to encourage 
uptake, some schemes nominate a ‘core’ set of 
criteria judged by compliance/non-compliance and a 
threshold of performance with room for improvement 
for all other requirements. Some schemes have, in 
addition to this, a graduated level of achievement, 
such as the Mining Association of Canada’s Towards 
Sustainable Mining scheme that allows for recognition 
at upper and lower ends of the performance curve. 
A graduated process is envisaged for the Global 
Industry Standard on Tailings Management, with 
a period for operators to address non-core gaps 
either before certification is granted or as part of a 
conditional certification. 
In terms of encouraging certification, the entity 
could consider establishing an online platform for 
private self-assessment, as a ‘confidence-builder’ 
for operators interested in certification. The Mining 
Association of Canada’s Towards Sustainable 
Mining scheme and the Aluminium Stewardship 
Initiative offer self-assessment tools for companies 
interested in testing their level of conformance before 
commencing the formal certification process.
Period of certification
At this stage, it is envisaged that certification would 
stand for a defined period, after which a follow-up 
assessment would be required. A shorter certification 
period for facilities that hold the potential for loss of 
life might be considered appropriate, with a longer 
period for facilities that have no potential for loss 
of life. This would reflect the goal of zero tolerance 
for human fatality and avoid low consequence 
facilities having to be subject to burdensome 
certification renewal processes. Likewise, the period 
of certification should also consider changes in a 
facility. For example, a tailings facility that has had 
multiple lifts or a facility that is approaching capacity 
may warrant a shorter recertification period. Change 
in ownership might also be a consideration, as these 
may substantially change resources and management 
focus.
A possible way forward is to require re-certification 
every f three years for higher consequence facilities 
(i.e. ‘Extreme’, ‘Very High’ or ‘High’), and at five 
year intervals for lower consequence facilities (i.e. 
‘Significant’ and ‘Low’), but this would need further 
discussion.. Given a shortage of experienced 
professionals available to assess against the 
Standard, differentiated time periods for certification 
could be a practical approach. Likewise, it may be 
prudent to calibrate a renewal process based on risk.
3.6  NON-COMPLIANCE AND CORRECTIVE 
ACTION
Addressing issues of non-conformance while under 
certification would be important for upholding the 
credibility of the scheme, while at the same time 
encouraging industry uptake. Most existing schemes 
are able to withdraw certification to sanction 
an identified or reported non-conformance. The 
Responsible Jewellery Council, for instance, applies a 
‘suspension’ procedure and a five-stage re-certification 
process. Other schemes can trigger a corrective 
action procedure that does not involve suspension, 
but rather, provides a defined period for the operator 
to correct the non-conformance before moving to 
suspension. 
Most certification schemes have a complaints 
mechanism for stakeholders to lodge complaints 
or issues. The Responsible Jewellery Council, for 
example, has a formal mechanism that aims to 
resolve complaints related to non-conformance 
with certification and accreditation of members. 
246 TOWARDS ZERO HARM – A COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS PREPARED FOR THE GLOBAL TAILINGS REVIEW 247TOWARDS ZERO HARM – A COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS PREPARED FOR THE GLOBAL TAILINGS REVIEW
with hundreds of facilities should proceed with 
certification. 
It is, of course, up to individual companies to 
sequence the certification of their facilities in the 
manner that they deem appropriate – the Standard 
is not prescriptive in this regard. Nonetheless, 
companies should be encouraged to reflect on the 
risk-based orientation of the Standard, and to seek 
certification of the highest risk facilities as a matter 
of priority. These are the facilities that most concern 
the market, external stakeholders and project-affected 
communities. 
4.3 LOCATION OF THE NEW ENTITY
The issue of which jurisdiction the entity should be 
located in would also need to be considered as part of 
a full design proposal.
5. SUGGESTED NEXT STEPS FOR THE CO-
CONVENERS
In this Paper we have provided an initial sketch 
of matters to be considered in designing and 
establishing an independent entity to drive the work 
of the GTR forward. How best to implement the 
Standard is an issue of critical importance, but this 
was not within the brief of the Independent Chair or 
the Expert Panel and, in any event, it is not a task that 
these parties are equipped to undertake. 
Rather, we see this as a matter that falls within 
the purview of the three co-conveners. This group 
proactively initiated the GTR to develop the Standard, 
and it is also the group that can drive the next phase. 
Without an effective implementation strategy, the 
time, effort and resources invested in building the 
Standard could dissipate and the problems which 
gave rise to the GTR persist. Involving all three co-
conveners will also help to ensure that the Standard 
continues to be viewed as a multi-stakeholder 
initiative that represents a broad range of interests.
Below are five recommended actions which we 
believe will maintain the momentum for change and 
ensure that the return on the work and effort that has 
been put into developing the Standard is maximised.
1. Once the Standard has been formally endorsed 
by the co-conveners, the parties should actively 
promote the Standard to their respective 
constituencies, and other interested parties.
The process of lodging a complaint is clearly 
articulated, and available to the public. Likewise, the 
Cyanide Code has a multi-tiered dispute resolution 
process that allows stakeholders to challenge audit 
findings. Any new independent entity should consider 
similar processes, particularly given the Standard’s 
requirements that relate to the reporting of concerns 
and complaints.
3.7  FAILURE EVENTS
The Standard includes requirements for emergency 
planning and local-level preparedness, and pre-
emptive engagement about long-term recovery in 
the event of a failure. However, in the immediate 
aftermath of an incident, certification could be 
‘suspended’ while facts are established. If necessary, 
it is envisaged that certification could be revoked. 
A corollary would be that the entity would want to 
review the most recent audit report to determine if the 
assessors missed anything or if the Standard or any 
of the protocol or guidance documents were deficient.
To uphold a commitment to suspend certification 
after a major failure event, the certifying organisation 
would have to define a threshold for ‘catastrophe’. It 
is possible, for instance, that a facility experienced 
a failure, but that control measures prevented 
catastrophic outcomes. Such an incident may result 
in a suspension and corrective action, rather than a 
revocation. The procedures and protocols for dealing 
with both catastrophic and non-catastrophic failure 
events would need to be carefully and thoughtfully 
developed. 
3.8   INITIAL PROGRAMME OF WORK
Once established, a first task of an independent entity 
would be to prepare audit procedures and protocols 
for the purposes of implementing the certification 
scheme. Amongst other things, this would include 
defining: 
a. indicators for each requirement
b. rankings or weightings of certain requirements 
c. minimum standards of evidence
d. criteria for accrediting assessors
e. how often, and under what circumstances, 
certifications need to be renewed
f. consequences for non-conformance
g. data collection, reporting and archiving. 
There are many voluntary schemes and standards, 
and the new entity would need to ensure that its 
scheme takes priority place for tailings management 
in the evolving landscape of voluntary schemes 
available to the global mining industry.
In order to encourage certification, the independent 
entity would need to publicise the scheme, and 
communicate information about the certification 
process, including the ‘value proposition’ for why 
companies should submit to this process. It would 
also be beneficial for the entity to engage with other 
organisations that may utilise the results of audits: 
such as insurance companies, banks, investment 
funds and regulatory agencies. If these organisations 
see the certification process as credible and are 
willing to use the outcomes to inform decisions (e.g. 
about whether to invest in or insure a company, or 
approve a licence application), this will be a significant 
incentive for companies to participate in the scheme.
4. OTHER MATTERS TO RESOLVE
4.1  RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER SCHEMES AND 
THE ISSUE OF ‘EQUIVALENCY’
Once the entity is established and develops 
implementation protocols, there will need to be 
consideration of ‘equivalency’ with existing voluntary 
schemes and standards – where operators seeking 
certification are relieved of having to demonstrate 
conformance if this has been demonstrated under a 
cognate scheme. 
Industry concerns about adding to the audit and 
assessment burden were a prominent theme 
during the public consultation and would need to be 
addressed. The degree to which existing standards 
cover the specific requirements associated with the 
safe management of tailings facilities – and can 
therefore be considered equivalent – will need to be 
forensically analysed and carefully calibrated. 
It is logical to first construct a standard that covered 
all necessary requirements – both general and 
specific – and then for the independent entity to 
consider equivalency as a high priority matter. It is 
only after finalising the Standard that this question 
can be fully interrogated. 
4.2  PRIORITISING FACILITIES FOR 
CERTIFICATION
The scope of the GTR was focused on large facilities 
and does not discern on the basis of whether those 
facilities are owned or operated by a company with 
one, or many facilities. The Standard does not, 
therefore, address the question of how a company 
The ICMM is ideally placed to promote the Standard 
to mining companies and industry bodies; the UNEP 
has an opportunity to engage with State actors as 
part of the implementation of the UNEA4 resolution 
on Mineral Resource Governance; and the PRI can 
provide a valuable conduit into the investment 
community. The co-conveners are also encouraged to 
present on the Standard at professional forums, such 
as researcher and practitioner conferences, and to 
groups of other interested stakeholders.
2. The co-conveners should formally launch the 
Standard and announce that: (a) a small working 
group will be formed to develop a design proposal 
for the establishment of an independent entity; 
and (b) the intention is for the new entity to be 
established within a 6-12 month time frame. 
The design proposal should address the matters 
that have been raised in the preceding discussion, 
including: the role and scope of the new entity, 
governance arrangements, location, resourcing 
requirements, and how the entity will be funded in the 
start-up phase, and over the longer term. The working 
group should comprise people with experience in 
designing and administering voluntary certification 
schemes, or who have extensive knowledge about the 
operation of such schemes. The proposal should map 
out a plan of work for the first 6-12 months, and define 
key performance indicators.
3. Other bodies that have developed standards and/
or are engaged in certification processes relevant 
to tailings should be encouraged to begin exploring 
equivalency issues between these schemes and 
the Standard. 
This will be key to maximising uptake of the Standard 
and minimising duplication. Relevant initiatives 
include Mining Association of Canada’s Towards 
Sustainable Mining Tailings Management Protocol, 
the Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance, and 
the World Gold Council’s Responsible Gold Mining 
Principles.
4. Establish a multi-stakeholder reference group to 
provide input and feedback to the co-conveners 
and the Working Group on the design of the new 
entity. 
The reference group could include representatives of 
key stakeholder groups, including the mining industry, 
insurers and investors, civil society, and government 
representatives. This would reflect the multi-
stakeholder architecture of the first phase of the GTR 
work and provide confidence to all stakeholders as the 
next phase of work moves forward.
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with hundreds of facilities should proceed with 
certification. 
It is, of course, up to individual companies to 
sequence the certification of their facilities in the 
manner that they deem appropriate – the Standard 
is not prescriptive in this regard. Nonetheless, 
companies should be encouraged to reflect on the 
risk-based orientation of the Standard, and to seek 
certification of the highest risk facilities as a matter 
of priority. These are the facilities that most concern 
the market, external stakeholders and project-affected 
communities. 
4.3 LOCATION OF THE NEW ENTITY
The issue of which jurisdiction the entity should be 
located in would also need to be considered as part of 
a full design proposal.
5. SUGGESTED NEXT STEPS FOR THE CO-
CONVENERS
In this Paper we have provided an initial sketch 
of matters to be considered in designing and 
establishing an independent entity to drive the work 
of the GTR forward. How best to implement the 
Standard is an issue of critical importance, but this 
was not within the brief of the Independent Chair or 
the Expert Panel and, in any event, it is not a task that 
these parties are equipped to undertake. 
Rather, we see this as a matter that falls within 
the purview of the three co-conveners. This group 
proactively initiated the GTR to develop the Standard, 
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Without an effective implementation strategy, the 
time, effort and resources invested in building the 
Standard could dissipate and the problems which 
gave rise to the GTR persist. Involving all three co-
conveners will also help to ensure that the Standard 
continues to be viewed as a multi-stakeholder 
initiative that represents a broad range of interests.
Below are five recommended actions which we 
believe will maintain the momentum for change and 
ensure that the return on the work and effort that has 
been put into developing the Standard is maximised.
1. Once the Standard has been formally endorsed 
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promote the Standard to their respective 
constituencies, and other interested parties.
The process of lodging a complaint is clearly 
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process that allows stakeholders to challenge audit 
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requirements that relate to the reporting of concerns 
and complaints.
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is possible, for instance, that a facility experienced 
a failure, but that control measures prevented 
catastrophic outcomes. Such an incident may result 
in a suspension and corrective action, rather than a 
revocation. The procedures and protocols for dealing 
with both catastrophic and non-catastrophic failure 
events would need to be carefully and thoughtfully 
developed. 
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d. criteria for accrediting assessors
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f. consequences for non-conformance
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5. Co-conveners should explore the potential for 
tracking the immediate and organic uptake of the 
Standard, in all its forms, prior to the establishment 
of the independent entity.
In the 6-12 months before the entity is formally 
established, the Standard will take on a life of its own. 
Already, elements of the Standard are being referred 
to in public presentations, policies and standards; 
referenced in academic papers; discussed at industry 
forums; incorporated into policies and standards; and 
considered for incorporation into law or regulatory 
guidance in several jurisdictions globally. A university 
research centre, or similar entity, could be supported 
to track uptake in this intervening period, which would 
help to validate the utility of the Standard, and build 
confidence that the work is relevant and important. 
Once established, the independent entity would 
formalise a monitoring and evaluation programme as 
part of its core programme of work. 
6. CONCLUSION
This Paper has elaborated a potential pathway for 
establishing an independent entity to house the 
Standard, and to support its evolution. Reflecting 
the urgency of the challenge, the Standard and 
accompanying GTR Papers were completed through 
a rapid and concerted effort. To maintain momentum, 
we encourage the co-conveners to initiate the next 
phase of work and to continue the process with the 
same sense of urgency. This way, the Standard can be 
deployed globally, to full effect, as soon as possible.
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Co-convened by the International Council on  
Mining and Metals (ICMM), United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) and Principles for 
Responsible Investment (PRI), the Global Tailings 
Review has established a robust, fit-for-purpose 
international standard for the safer management of 
tailings storage facilities.
